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THE UNANIMOUS ACQUITTAL INSTRUCTION:
A RATIONAL APPROACH TO INSTRUCTING
JURORS ON LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES
1. Introduction
Consider a criminal proceeding in which the state has charged a
defendant with first degree murder.' Before the jury begins its
deliberations, the judge instructs the jurors to consider not only the
charge of first degree murder,2 but also the lesser included offenses'
1. This hypothetical is based on the facts of Stone v. Superior Court, 31 Cal.
3d 503, 646 P.2d 809, 183 Cal. Rptr. 647 (1982) (en banc).
2. The California Penal Code defines first degree murder in the following
manner:
All murder which is perpetrated by means of a destructive device or
explosive, knowing use of ammunition designed primarily to penetrate
metal or armor, poison, lying in wait, torture, or by any other kind of
willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, or which is committed in
the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, arson, rape, robbery,
burglary, mayhem ....
CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 1970 & Supp. 1987) (emphasis omitted).
3. "Lesser included offenses," as used in this Note, consist of fewer elements
than the greater, or charged, offense; carry less severe penalties than the greater
offense; and share such common elements with the greater offense that commission
of the greater presupposes the simultaneous commission of the lesser. See 9 FED.
PROC. L. ED. § 22:848 (1982 & Supp. 1987); see also State v. Lovelace, 212 Neb.
356, 359, 322 N.W.2d 673, 675 (1982) (impossible to commit greater without
committing lesser); 4 C. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 580 (12th
ed. 1976 & Supp. 1981). Several examples follow:
[Miurder includes such lesser offenses as second-degree murder, man-
slaughter, and negligent homicide. Robbery necessarily includes larceny,
and assault with intent to rob. Rape necessarily includes assault with
intent to rape. Assault with a dangerous weapon includes simple assault.
Theft of property in excess of $100 includes the lesser wrong of theft
of property of value not exceeding $100.
3 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL 2D § 515, at 21-22
(2d ed. 1982 & Supp. 1987) (citations omitted) [hereinafter WRIGHT].
Courts generally use the terms "lesser included offense" and "necessarily included
offense" interchangeably, see, e.g., Olais-Castro v. United States, 416 F.2d 1155,
1157 (9th Cir. 1969), but distinctions have been made between the two. See McGill
v. State, 465 N.E.2d 211 (Ind. App. 1984); Koenig, The Many-Headed Hydra of
Lesser Included Offenses: A Herculean Task For the Michigan Courts, 1975 DET.
C.L. REV. 41, 41-44 (lesser included offenses are closely related to charged offense,
but determination of guilt on lesser offense may rest on specific facts in issue;
necessarily included offense is always committed simultaneously with greater offense).
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of second degree murder, 4 voluntary manslaughter' and involuntary
manslaughter. 6 This gives the jury three options: (1) declare the
defendant guilty of murder in the first degree;7 (2) declare the
defendant guilty of any of the three uncharged lesser included of-
fenses; or (3) acquit the defendant. Traditionally, judges instruct
juries to consider the charged offense first and to cease deliberations
if a verdict of guilty is unanimously8 agreed upon. 9 Courts disagree,
however, on the proper procedure for instructing jurors to consider
lesser offenses in the event that they cannot unanimously return a
guilty verdict on the greater offense.' 0
4. Second degree murder includes "all other kinds of murders" not already
enumerated in § 189 of the California Penal Code. CAL PENAL CODE § 189 (West
1970 & Supp. 1987).
5. Voluntary manslaughter is "the unlawful killing of a human being without
malice ... upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion." Id. § 192 (West 1970 &
Supp. 1987).
6. Involuntary manslaughter constitutes "the unlawful killing of a human being
without malice ... in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to felony;
or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful
manner, or without due caution and circumspection." Id:
7. In this hypothetical, first degree murder is the "charged offense." Courts
use the terms "charged offense" and "greater offense" interchangeably. See, e.g.,
United States v. Jackson, 726 F.2d 1466, 1469 (9th Cir. 1984); Pharr v. Israel,
629 F.2d 1278, 1281 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1088 (i981).
8. For the purposes of this Note, it is assumed that any final verdict rendered
by the jury must be unanimous. Although the Supreme Court has held that non-
unanimous verdicts are constitutional in state criminal trials, see Johnson v. Louis-
iana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972) (affirming 9-3 final verdict); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406
U.S. 404 (1972) (affirming 10-2 and 11-1 'conviction), only five states allow less-
than-unanimous final verdicts in such cases. See IDAHO CONST. art. 1, § 7; LA.
CONST. art. 1, § 17; OKLA. CONST. art. 11, § 19; OR. CONST. art. 1, § 11; TEX.
CONST. art. V, § 13. Non-unanimous verdicts rendered by six person juries are
unconstitutional. See Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 134 (1979).
9. Courts instruct jurors that they may consider lesser offenses only upon
finding the accused "not guilty" of the greater offense. See Pharr, 629 F.2d at
1279; United States v. Tsanas, 572 F.2d 340, 344 n.4 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 995 (1978); O'Clair v. United States, 470 F.2d 1199, 1204 (1st Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 921 (1973); United States v. Butler, 455 F.2d 1338, 1340
(D.C. Cir. 1971); State v. Wussler, 139 Ariz. 428, 429, 679 P.2d 74, 75 (1984)
(en banc); Middlebrooks v. State, 156 Ga. App. 319, 320, 274 S.E.2d 643, 644
(1980); People v. Magliato, I10 A.D.2d 266, 268, 494 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309 (1st Dep't
1985), aff'd, 68 N.Y.2d 24, 496 N.E.2d 856, 505 N.Y.S.2d 836 (1986); State v.
Harris, 62 Wash. 2d 858, 871, 385 P.2d 18, 26 (1963); 2 WRIGHT, supra note 3
§ 498, at 800.
10. See United States v. Cardinal, 782 F.2d 34, 36-37 (6th Cir.) (unanimous
acquittal instruction), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1161 (1986); United States v. Roland,
748 F.2d 1321, 1323-24 (2d Cir. 1984) (either unanimous acquittal or disagreement
instruction); United States v. Jackson, 726 F.2d 1466, 1469 (9th Cir. 1984) (same);
United States v. Moccia, 681 F.2d 61, 64 (1st Cir. 1982) (unanimous acquittal
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Some courts require judges to instruct juries to return a unanimous
verdict of not guilty on the charged offense prior to considering
any lesser included offenses.' This type of lesser included offense
instruction is known as the "unanimous acquittal instruction."'' 2 In
the hypothetical above, such an instruction would require that the
jury unanimously acquit the defendant of first degree murder before
considering the charge of second degree murder.' 3 Similarly, a unan-
imous acquittal of the second degree murder charge would be a
prerequisite to consideration of any of the manslaughter charges. 4
Courts favoring the unanimous acquittal rule contend that this in-
struction guarantees all jurors an opportunity to express fully their
views on the evidence presented at trial because all jurors must agree
to acquit the defendant of the charged offense before rendering a
final verdict on any of the lesser included offenses. 5
Other courts, however, permit consideration of lesser included
offenses when the jury cannot agree whether conviction of the greater
instruction); Pharr, 629 F.2d at 1281-82 (same); United States v. Hanson, 618 F.2d
1261, 1265-66 (8th Cir. 1980) (same), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 854 (1980); Catches
v. United States, 582 F.2d 453, 458-59 (8th Cir. 1978) (either instruction); Tsanas,
572 F.2d at 346 (same); Butler, 455 F.2d at 1340 (unanimous acquittal instruction);
Fuller v. United States, 407 F.2d 1199, 1227-29 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (same), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1120 (1968); Lee v. Taylor, 566 F. Supp. 28, 31 (N.D. Ohio
1983) (disagreement instruction); Lindsey v. State, 456 So. 2d 383, 387 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1983) (unanimous acquittal instruction), aff'd sub noin. Ex parte Lindsey,
456 So. 2d 393 (Ala. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1023 (1985); Dresnek v. State,
718 P.2d 156, 157 (Alaska) (same), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 679 (1986); Arizona
v. Fletcher, 149 Ariz. 187, 190, 717 P.2d 866, 869 (1986) (en banc) (same); Stone
v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 503, 519-20, 646 P.2d 809, 820, 183 Cal. Rptr. 647,
658 (1982) (same); Middlebrooks, 156 Ga. App. at 320, 274 S.E.2d at 644 (same);
Commonwealth v. Edgerly, 13 Mass. App. Ct. 562, 582 n.18, 435 N.E.2d 641,
652 n.18 (1982) (same); People v. Mays, 407 Mich. 619, 622-23, 288 N.W.2d 207,
208 (1980) (disagreement instruction); People v. Boettcher, 69 N.Y.2d 174, 183,
505 N.E.2d 594, 597-98, 513 N.Y.S.2d 83, 87 (1987) (unanimous acquittal in-
struction); State v. Wilkins, 34 N.C. App. 392, 399-400, 238 S.E.2d 659, 664-65
(1977) (same); State v. Allen, 301 Or. 35, 40, 717 P.2d 1178, 1179 (1986) (disa-
greement instruction); Ballinger v. State, 437 P.2d 305, 309-10 (Wyo. 1968) (unan-
imous acquittal instruction).
11. See Wussler, 139 Ariz. at 430, 679 P.2d at 76; Boettcher, 69 N.Y.2d at
179, 505 N.E.2d at 595, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 84.
12. Courts have also referred to the unanimous acquittal instruction as the
"acquittal-first" instruction, see Allen, 301 Or. at 38, 717 P.2d at 1180, and as
the "transition" instruction. See Dresnek v. State, 697 P.2d 1059, 1060 (Alaska
Ct. App.), aff'd, 718 P.2d 156 (Alaska 1985), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 679 (1986).
13. See infra note 42 and accompanying text.
14. See id.
15. See Tsanas, 572 F.2d at 345-46; Dresnek, 697 P.2d at 1062; Boettcher, 69
N.Y.2d at 183, 505 N.E.2d at 597-98, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 87.
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offense is appropriate.' 6 This type of instruction is known as the
"disagreement instruction."' 7 Although this instruction makes jury
deliberations more efficient and may reduce the number of hung 9
juries, it also substantially increases the likelihood that the jury will
ultimately return a "compromise verdict."0
16. Only a minority of courts have adopted this approach. See infra notes 75-
76 and accompanying text.
In addition to the two approaches discussed in this Note, a third approach-
the "reasonable doubt instruction"-has been used in a number of states including
Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii and Wisconsin. See People v. Padilla, 638 P.2d 15,
17-18 (Colo. 1981) (en banc); Evans v. State, 148 Ga. App. 422, 423, 251 S.E.2d
325, 326 (1978); State v. Santiago, 55 Haw. 162, 165, 516 P.2d 1256, 1258 (1973);
State v. McNeal, 95 Wis. 2d 63, 67 n.l, 288 N.W.2d 874, 876 n.l (Ct. App.
1980). Under the reasonable doubt instruction, the jurors are told, "[ilf you are
not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of an offense
charged, or you entertain a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt, you may
consider [lesser included offenses]." People v. McGregor, 635 P.2d 912, 914 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1981). One court has held that the effect of the reasonable doubt instruction
is the same as that of the unanimous acquittal instruction. See People v. Mays,
407 Mich. 619, 623, 288 N.W.2d 207, 208 (1980). For a general discussion of the
reasonable doubt instruction, see Note, Improving Jury Deliberations: A Recon-
sideration of Lesser Included Offense Instructions, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 561
(1982-83) [hereinafter Improving Jury Deliberations].
17. See infra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
18. The disagreement instruction obviates the need for protracted deliberations
when the jury becomes deadlocked on the greater offense because the jury may
immediately compromise on a lesser offense. See Boettcher, 69 N.Y.2d at 183, 505
N.E.2d at 597-98, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 87.
19. A hung jury is "a jury (1) which, in the judgment of the court, has
deliberated for a proper period of time, and (2) which has been discharged by the
court because there appears to be no reasonable probability that the jury can agree
upon a verdict." Flynn, Does Justice Fail When the Jury is Deadlocked?, 61
JUDICATURE 129, 130 (1977-78) [hereinafter Flynn]. For a discussion of using lesser
included offense instructions as a means of reducing the number of hung juries,
see Improving Jury Deliberations, supra note 16.
20. A compromise verdict occurs when the jury exercises its mercy dispensing
power and returns a verdict on the lesser offense even though the defendant is in
fact guilty of the greater offense. Cf. United States v. Harary, 457 F.2d 471, 478-
79 (2d Cir. 1972) (compromise verdict may occur as result of jury taking easier
course when it cannot agree on basic issue of guilt and causing unjust conviction
of defendant on lesser offense instead of acquittal). Although compromise verdicts
are not automatic grounds for reversal, see Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S.
10, 22 (1980) (jury may acquit out of compassion or compromise); United States
v. Campbell, 684 F.2d 141, 151 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (compromise verdicts are not
unacceptable), judges strongly discourage them. See People v. Boettcher, 69 N.Y.2d
174, 183, 505 N.E.2d 594, 597-98, 513 N.Y.S.2d 83, 87 (1987); People v. Mussenden,
308 N.Y. 558, 563, 127 N.E.2d 551, 554 (1955); see also Fuller v. United States,
407 F.2d 1199, 1229 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1120 (1968)
(jury not given absolute discretion to find defendant guilty of lesser offense when
plainly guilty of greater offense).
JURY INSTRUCTIONS
This Note proposes that all courts embrace the unanimous acquittal
instruction because it encourages the jury to engage in an effective
and conscientious deliberative process. 2' The disagreement instruction
not only fosters imprudent decision making, but also invites the
jury to abuse its power to render a compromise verdict and thus
is a wholly inappropriate method for instructing jurors on their
consideration of lesser included offenses.22 Part 1I of this Note
explores the background of the lesser offense doctrine, the elements
of each instruction and the rationale behind recent judicial precedent
in this area. Part III sets forth empirical research on jury behavior
and analyzes judicial authority illustrating that the unanimous ac-
quittal instruction substantially increases the effectiveness of the
jury's decision making process. The Note concludes that courts must
uniformly adopt the unanimous acquittal rule in order to maintain
the integrity of the deliberative process.
II. The Lesser Included Offense Doctrine
Lesser included offense instructions affect both the order in which
the jury considers each offense and the manner in which the jury
approaches the entire deliberative process.23 The lesser included of-
fense doctrine ensures that a jury will accord a defendant the full
benefit of his right to be presumed innocent2 4 and of the reasonable
doubt standard.2" The most prominent of the approaches used to
21. See infra notes 89-137 and accompanying text.
22. See Dresnek, 697 P.2d at 1060-61; State v. Wussler, 139 Ariz. 428, 430,
679 P.2d 74, 76 (1984) (en banc); Boettcher, 69 N.Y.2d at 182-83, 505 N.E.2d at
597-98, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 86-87.
23. See infra notes 26-82 and accompanying text.
24. See generally Mascolo, Procedural Due Process and the Lesser-Included
Offense Doctrine, 50 ALB. L. REV. 263 (1986) [hereinafter Mascolol.
25. See Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 634-35 (1980); Keeble v. United States,
412 U.S. 205, 212-13 (1973). The lesser included offense instruction provides a jury
with the option of finding the defendant guilty of a lesser crime. See United States
v. Forsythe, 594 F.2d 947, 952 (3d Cir. 1979); 3 WRIGHT, supra note 3, § 515, at
20. Without such an instruction, a jury faced with a reasonable doubt on some
element of the prosecution's proof should return a verdict of acquittal. See Keeble,
412 U.S. at 212. By instructing on lesser offenses, however, courts avoid the risk
that "practice will diverge from theory." Id. In other words, if the jury believes
that a defendant is guilty of some offense, though perhaps not the one originally
charged, the defendant may suffer an unjust punishment because the jury had no
other option and simply resolved all of its doubts in favor of conviction. Id. at
212-13; United States v. Johnson, 637 F.2d 1224, 1233-34, 1238 (9th Cir. 1980)
(defendant entitled to lesser offense instruction upon showing of (1) identifiable
lesser offense and (2) rational basis for jury finding defendant guilty of lesser
offense and innocent of greater offense).
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instruct jurors on their consideration of lesser offenses are the
unanimous acquittal instruction and the disagreement instruction.
A. Background
A lesser included offense is composed of some of the elements
of the greater offense, so that commission of the greater offense
presupposes the simultaneous commission of the lesser.26 Under the
lesser included offense doctrine,27 the jury may convict a defendant
of any lesser offense necessarily included in the charged offense,
thus allowing the state to obtain a valid conviction for a crime not
named in the indictment or information."' At common law, the
doctrine performed two functions. First, it facilitated a conviction
when the state had overcharged the defendant or failed to establish
all elements of the greater offense at trial. 9 A jury, not convinced
26. See supra note 3; see also Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 349-50
(1965) (instruction proper only when conviction of greater offense would require
jury to find disputed factual element not required for conviction of lesser offense);
FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(c).
Many states have statutes that provide for lesser included offenses. See ALA.
CODE § 13A-1-9 (1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2149 (1977); CAL. PENAL CODE§ 1157 (West 1985); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-408 (1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 206 (1979); IDAHO CODE § 19-2312 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 2-9 (Smith-
Hurd 1972); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-1-16 (Burns 1985); IOWA CODE ANN. § 813.2
r.21 (West 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3107(3) (1981); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 505.020 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:5 (West 1986);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 13A (1983); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 278, § 12
(Law. Co-op. 1985); MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.32 'West 1982); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 609.04 (West Supp. 1987); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-5 (1973); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 556.046 (Vernon 1979); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-11-501-2(a) (1987); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-8 (West 1982); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 300.50 (McKinney
1981); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2945.74 (Anderson 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
22, § 916 (West 1986); OR. REV. STAT. § 136.460 (1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-
17-14 (1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-26-8 (1979); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 40-18-110 (1982); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.09 (Vernon 1981); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-1-402 (1978); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.66 (West 1982 & Supp.
1987); Wyo. R. CRIM. P. 32; MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07(4)(a) (Proposed Official
Draft 1962) (lesser included offense "established by proof of the same or less than
all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged").
27. The Supreme Court first announced this doctrine in Stevenson v. United
States, 162 U.S. 313, 323 (1896). See also Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 635
n.l 1 (1980) (attributing origin of lesser offense doctrine in United States to Stevenson).
28. See United States v. Tsanas, 572 F.2d 340, 345 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 995 (1978); Walker v. United States, 418 F.2d 1116, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
(defendant deemed on notice of any lesser included offenses).
29. See Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 208 (1973); 3 WRIGHT, supra
note 3, § 515, at 20. The doctrine is now codified in the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure: "The defendant may be found guilty of an offense necessarily included
in the offense charged or of an attempt to commit either the offense charged or
an offense necessarily included therein if the attempt is an offense." FED. R. CRIM.
P. 31(c).
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beyond a reasonable doubt as to guilt on the charged offense, could
convict the defendant of a less severe offense on the basis of the
undisputed elements of the greater offense. 1 As a procedural device,
this provided the jury with a third verdict option in addition to
conviction of the charged offense or outright acquittal.3' Second,
the doctrine protected a defendant against repeated attempts to
prosecute for the same offense. 2 Modern practice now bars the
subsequent prosecution of a lesser included offense that could have
been tried with the greater offense following an acquittal of the
greater offense. 33
Typically the judge instructed the jury on lesser offenses only
after a request from one of the parties.3 4 Although prosecutors have
30. See, e.g., Tsanas, 572 F.2d at 346.
31. See Beck, 447 U.S. at 633; Keeble, 412 U.S. at 212-13; United States v.
Forsythe, 594 F.2d 947, 952 (3d Cir. 1979) (purpose of instruction is to give
defendant possibility that jury may find him guilty of offense with less severe
sentence); 3 WRIGHT, supra note 3, § 515, at 20.
32. See Recent Developments in the Criminal Law, The Included 0Jfense Doc-
trine in California, 10 UCLA L. REV. 870, 873 (1963). The same considerations
underlie double jeopardy provisions. See Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 498-99
(1984) (double jeopardy clauses of fifth and fourteenth amendments protect accused
from subsequent prosecution for same offense after acquittal, and from multiple
prosecutions for same offense); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 190-91 (1957)
(doctrine of implied acquittal protects against double jeopardy).
33. See United States v. Seijo, 537 F.2d 694, 698 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1043 (1977). Similarly, conviction on the greater charge prevents relitigation
on the lesser charge. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 168-69 (1977): Jeffers v.
United States, 432 U.S. 137, 150-51 (1977).
In a similar situation, when the jury has deadlocked on a lesser offense, but
has unanimously agreed to acquit on a greater offense, courts should accept partial
verdicts before declaring a mistrial in order to avoid the costs of retrial on those
greater offenses. See Note, Acceptance of Partial Verdicts as a Safeguard Against
Double Jeopardy, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 889 (1985) [hereinafter Partial Verdictsl.
34. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 492 F.2d 359, 362 (8th Cir. 1974):
State v. Jacobs, 194 Conn. 119, 127, 479 A.2d 226, 230-31 (1984), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1190 (1985) (conviction for first degree murder proper despite absence
of lesser included offense instruction because no appropriate instruction requested).
A growing number of states now permit judges to give the lesser included offense
instruction regardless of any request by the parties. See Stone v. -Superior Court,
31 Cal. 3d 503, 517, 646 P.2d 809, 819, 183 Cal. Rptr. 647, 657 (1982); State v.
Herron, 349 S.W.2d 936, 940 (Mo. 1961); State v. Hicks, 241 N.C. 156, 159-60.
84 S.E.2d 545, 547-48 (1954); Provo v. State, 549 P.2d 354, 357-58 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1976), aff'd, 565 P.2d 719 (Okla. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1071 (1978):
Strader v. State, 210 Tenn. 669, 679, 362 S.W.2d 224, 228 (1962); see also United
States v. Singleton, 447 F. Supp. 852, 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (conviction may be
reversed for failure of court to instruct sua sponte on lesser offenses if it amounts
to plain error).
In giving a lesser offense instruction, a court may inform the jury that it can
convict on either the charged offense or the lesser included offense. See Tsanas
1988]
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traditionally made such requests, defendants gradually began to re-
quest these instructions as the defense bar recognized their benefits.35
Such instructions provide the jury with an opportunity to "temper
justice with mercy," '3 6 and provide the defendant with an extra
measure of defense against the greater crime."
In the case of a defendant charged with a capital offense, the
lesser included offense doctrine rises to the level of a constitutional
right. 18 Although no constitutional right to have the jury instructed
on lesser offenses exists in non-capital cases,3 9 many lower courts
require the instruction if the evidence would justify conviction of
the lesser offense. 41, Finally, a determination of guilt on the charged
v. United States, 572 F.2d 340 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 995 (1978).
Furthermore, if the court finds insufficient evidence to establish an element of the
greater offense beyond a reasonable doubt, it may submit only the lesser offense
to the jury. See United States v. LoRusso, 695 F.2d 45, 52 n.3 (2d Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1070 (1983).
35. See 3 WRIGHT, supra note 3, § 515, at 20.
36. Id.; see People v. Clemente, 285 A.D. 258, 264, 136 N.Y.S.2d 202, 207
(1st Dep't 1954) (jury may indulge in tender mercies and acquit plainly guilty
defendant).
37. The defense may assert that the defendant did not commit the greater
offense because he only committed the lesser offense. See Larson v. United States,
296 F.2d 80, 81 (10th Cir. 1961) (lesser included offense instruction provides "jury
a measure of defense to which the defendant is entitled").
38. See-Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637-38 (1980). The risk of an un-
warranted conviction cannot be tolerated when the defendant's life is at stake and
the death sentence may not be imposed in a capital case when the jury was
prohibited from considering a lesser included offense. Id.
39. See Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 213 (1973). The Court has never
explicitly held that the due process clause of the fifth amendment guarantees a
defendant the right to have the jury instructed on a lesser included offense. Id.
But see generally Mascolo, supra note 24 (lesser included offense doctrine should
qualify for constitutional status in both capital and non-capital cases as element
of procedural due process because it reduces risk of erroneous decisions).
40. See Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 351 (1965); Stevenson v. United
States, 162 U.S. 313, 314 (1896); United States v. Jackson, 726 F.2d 1466, 1469
(9th Cir. 1984); O'Clair v. United States, 470 F.2d 1199, 1204 (1st Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 921 (1973); Fuller v. United States, 407 F.2d 1199, 1229
(D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1120 (1969); State v. Valencia, 121 Ariz.
191, 198, 589 P.2d 434, 441 (1979) (en banc); People v. Scarborough, 49 N.Y.2d
364, 368, 402 N.E.2d 1127, 1129, 426 N.Y.S.2d 224, 226 (1980). See generally
Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 635-36 nn.l 1-12 (1980) (citing state and federal
cases supporting assertion that defendant is entitled to lesser offense instruction
when evidence would justify conviction of lesser offense). But cf. Sansone, 380
U.S. at 349-50 (lesser offense instruction improper when factual issues to be resolved
by jury are same as to both lesser and greater offenses); United States v. Campbell,
652 F.2d 760, 761-62 (8th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (lesser offense instruction improper
when lesser offense includes element not in greater offense and additional element
of greater offense would not justify jury finding of guilt on lesser offense).
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offense generally precludes any deliberation on the lesser offense.,"
B. The Unanimous Acquittal Instruction
The unanimous acquittal instruction requires that the jury "unan-
imously find the accused 'not guilty' of the crime charged in the
indictment (information) ... [before proceeding] to determine the
guilt or innocence of the accused as to any lesser offense .... ''42
This instruction arose from the traditional requirement of jury
unanimity 43 and was later embodied in federal pattern jury instruc-
tions. 44
The propriety of this instruction was first addressed in United
States v. Tsanas.45 On appeal of his conviction for tax evasion,
Tsanas argued that the trial court erred in requiring the jury to
unanimously acquit him on the greater offense of evading income
taxes before considering the lesser charge of willfully filing a false
tax return.4 6 Tsanas contended that the trial court should have charged
the jury under the disagreement instruction. 47
41. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. A defendant cannot be found
guilty of both the greater offense and the lesser included offense. See Milanovich
v. United States, 365 U.S. 551, 553-54 (1961) (when defendant convicted of both
greater and lesser offense, conviction of lesser vacated); see, e.g., United States v.
Crawford, 576 F.2d 794, 800 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 851 (1978); United
States v. Dixon, 507 F.2d 683, 684 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 976
(1976); United States v. Lodwick, 410 F.2d 1202, 1205-06 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 841 (1969); State v. McNeal, 95 Wis. 2d 63, 68, 288 N.W.2d 874, 876
(1980).
42. E. DEVITT & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS
§ 18.05, at 582 (3d ed. 1977) [hereinafter DEVITT & BLACKMAR].
43. The advantages of requiring a jury to deliberate under the unanimous
acquittal instruction mirror those obtained when a jury operates under a rule that
requires unanimity in the final verdict. Cf. United States v. Tsanas, 572 F.2d 340,
346 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 995 (1978). Requiring unanimity promotes
fuller deliberations and greater accuracy in the final verdict. See Johnson v. Louis-
iana, 406 U.S. 356, 388-89 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); United States v. Fior-
avanti, 412 F.2d 407, 418 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 837 (1969).
44. See DEVITT & BLACKMAR, supra note 42, § 18.05, at 582.
45. 572 F.2d 340 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 995 (1978).
46. The trial court, without objection, charged the jury as follows:
The law permits the jury to find the accused guilty of any lesser offense
which is necessarily included in the crime charged in the indictment
whenever such a course is consistent with the facts found by the jury
... . If the jury should unanimously find the accused not guilty of the
crime charged in the indictment, then the jury must proceed to determine
the guilt or innocence of the accused as to the lesser offense which is
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit noted
the advantages and disadvantages to both the prosecution and the
defendant of each method of instruction.4 8 According to the court,
the unanimous acquittal instruction promotes full deliberation on
the greater offense but increases the chances of acquittal or mistrial
resulting from a hung jury. 49 From the defendant's standpoint, this
instruction increases the risk of a more severe conviction than would
have been rendered had the jury been provided with other verdict
options.5 0 The disagreement instruction increases the likelihood of
obtaining a conviction, but not necessarily for the offense with which
the defendant is charged." This instruction decreases the possibility
that the jury will deadlock52 or acquit, but increases the defendant's
chances of receiving some less severe conviction."
The court in Tsanas held that these factors balance each other
out and that neither instruction is "wrong as a matter of law." '5 4
The court concluded that a trial judge could properly give either
instruction, provided that the defendant does not make a timely
request for the instruction he prefers. 5
Many courts have criticized the reasoning behind the decision in
Tsanas1 6 Most recently, the New York Court of Appeals, in People
48. Id. at 345-46.
49. Id. at 346.
50. See id.
5 I. See id.
52. Jury deadlock occurs when there appears to be no reasonable probability
of agreement among the jurors. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 15-4.4(c),
at 144 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTI cE]. Relevant fac-
tors include the length of deliberation, see People v. Caradine, 235 Cal. App. 2d
45, 47, 44 Cal. Rptr. 875, 877 (1965), the length of the trial, see United States v.
Fitzgerald, 205 F. Supp. 515, 517-18 (N.D. 111. 1962), and the nature or complexity
of the case. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra, § 15-4.4(c), at 144.
53. See Tsanas, 572 F.2d at 345-46.
54. Id. at 346.
55. The defendant's request for a specific form of the instruction must be
timely. Id. In this case, the court properly rejected the request because the defendant
first made it on appeal. Id.; see also United States v. Cardinal, 782 F.2d 34, 37
(6th Cir.) (no error when defendant failed to object to form of instruction at trial),
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1161 (1986); United States v. Roland, 748 F.2d 1321, 1325
(2d Cir. 1984) (same).
Some courts have held that even the rejection of such a request fails to elevate
the error to constitutional magnitude. See United States v. Moccia, 681 F.2d 61,
64 (1st Cir. 1982); Catches v. United States, 582 F.2d 453, 459 (8th Cir. 1978).
56. See, e.g., Dresnek v. State, 697 P.2d 1059, 1061-62 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985)
(reasoning behind Tsanas decision is ambiguous and confusing), affd, 718 P.2d
156, 157 (Alaska 1986) (same), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 679 (1986); People v. Mays,
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v. Boettcher,5 7 rejected the idea that either instruction is proper and
expressly adopted the unanimous acquittal instruction."
Boettcher was charged with driving while intoxicated. 9 The trial
court rejected Boettcher's request that the jury be instructed to
consider the lesser included offense of driving while impaired if it
found the defendant not guilty of the greater offense or if it could
not reach agreement on the greater offense."' To justify use of the
more stringent unanimous acquittal rule, the court relied on prevailing
public policy 6' and a New York state statute authorizing the sub-
mission to the jury of lesser included offenses. 62 Under the New
York statute, "[a] verdict of guilty of one or more offenses is not
deemed an acquittal of any lesser offense submitted, but is deemed
an acquittal of every greater offense submitted." 63 Had the court
adopted either the Tsanas approach or the disagreement rule, a
conviction of a lesser offense would automatically be deemed an
acquittal of the greater offense "regardless of the jury's actual
findings or lack of findings regarding the greater offense .. ,.
The court concluded that a defendant should not be acquitted on
the greater offense unless a jury clearly finds him innocent of that
charge.61
The Boettcher court reiterated the principle that a jury should
not reach a compromise verdict-whether to pacify a stubborn juror
or out of sympathy for the defendant. 66 The court noted that while
compromise may be an inevitable factor in deliberations, the jury's
ultimate function is simply "to render a just verdict by applying
407 Mich. 619, 623, 288 N.W.2d 207, 208 (1980) (unanimous acquittal instruction
improperly interferes with jury's deliberations); People v. Boettcher, 69 N.Y.2d
174, 183, 505 N.E.2d 594, 597-98, 513 N.Y.S.2d 83, 87 (1987) (Tsanas gives
insufficient weight to proposition that jury should not reach compromise verdict).
57. 69 N.Y.2d 174, 505 N.E.2d 594, 513 N.Y.S.2d 83 (1987).
58. See id. at 182, 505 N.E.2d at 597, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
59. See id. at 178, 505 N.E.2d at 594-95, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 84.
60. See id.
61. The policy suggests that a defendant should not be protected from subsequent
prosecutions for the same offense unless a jury acquits him of that charge. See
id. at 183, 505 N.E.2d at 597, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 86; see also People v. Murch,
263 N.Y. 285, 291, 189 N.E. 220, 222 (1934) (lesser included offense doctrine
created to prevent prosecution from failing when some element of crime charged
not proven).
62. See Boettcher, 69 N.Y.2d at 181-82, 505 N.E.2d at 596, 513 N.Y.S.2d at
86; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 300.50(4) (McKinney 1982).
63. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 300.50(4) (McKinney 1982).
64. Boettcher, 69 N.Y.2d at 182, 505 N.E.2d at 597, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
65. See id. at 182, 505 N.E.2d at 597, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
66. See id. at 183, 505 N.E.2d at 597-98, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 87.
19881
FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL [Vol. XVI
the facts it finds to the law it is charged." ' 67 Accordingly, while the
disagreement instruction may reduce the number of hung juries by
providing a lesser included offense upon which a compromise can
be reached,68 courts should not encourage jury compromise for its
own sake. 69
Few courts have followed the Boettcher approach of sanctioning
only the unanimous acquittal rule 70 despite findings that such a rule
provides the jury with a more logical and orderly process for its
deliberations. 7' Rather, most courts have adopted the reasoning set
forth in Tsanas-that either instruction is proper as a matter of
law.
72
C. The Disagreement Instruction
The disagreement instruction directs the jury to "consider the
charge in the accusatory instrument and if it cannot agree on a
verdict on that charge it should then consider the lesser included
offenses . . . ,,71 Unlike the unanimous acquittal rule, this instruction
67. Id.
68. See Tsanas, 572 F.2d at 346.
69. See Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 178 (courts uniformly disapprove of
compromise verdicts but are without means to control occurrence); Boettcher, 69
N.Y.2d at 183, 505 N.E.2d at 597-98, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 87; People v. DeLucia, 20
N.Y.2d 275, 278, 229 N.E.2d 211, 213-14, 282 N.Y.S.2d 526, 529 (1967).
70. In addition to the New York Court of Appeals, only the Arizona state
courts approve instructions requiring the jury to acquit a defendant of the greater
offense before starting to consider lesser offenses. See State v. Wussler, 139 Ariz.
428, 430, 679 P.2d 74, 76 (1984) (en banc). Alaska and California state courts
permit consideration of lesser offenses along with the greater offense but require
a unanimous acquittal of the greater offense prior to the jury's rendering of any
verdict on a lesser offense. See Dresnek v. State, 697 P.2d 1059, 1061-62 (Alaska
Ct. App.), aff'd, 718 P.2d 156, 157 (Alaska 1985), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 679
(1986); People v. Zwiers, 191 Cal. App. 3d 1498, 237 Cal. Rptr. 123, 126 (1987).
71. See, e.g., Wussler, 139 Ariz. at 430, 679 P.2d at 76.
72. See, e.g., United States v. Cardinal, 782 F.2d 34, 37 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
476 U.S. 1161 (1986); United States v. Roland, 748 F.2d 1321, 1325 (2d Cir. 1984);
United States v. Jackson, 726 F.2d 1466, 1469 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Moccia, 681 F.2d 61, 64 (1st Cir. 1982); Pharr v. Israel, 629 F.2d 1278, 1282 (7th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1088 (1981); United States v. Hanson, 618 F.2d
1261, 1265-66 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 854 (1980); Lindsey v. State,
456 So. 2d 383, 388 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983), aff'd sub. nom Ex parte Lindsey,
456 So. 2d 393 (Ala. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1023 (1985); People v. Padilla,
638 P.2d 15, 18 (Colo. 1981).
73. State v. Ogden, 35 Or. App. 91, 98, 580 P.2d 1049, 1053 (1978). The
Michigan courts instruct the jury to direct their attention first to the charged
offense, but "[ulnless all . . . agree to find the defendant guilty of (the charged
offense), [it] may consider the other offenses ... .." People v. Mays, 407 Mich.
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allows the jury to consider lesser included offenses without firstv
agreeing upon the defendant's guilt or innocence under the charged
offense.74 Only a minority of jurisdictions explicitly employ this
approach.75 Other jurisdictions, however, tacitly accept its use to
secure a verdict when the jury deadlocks.7 6
The Supreme Court of Oregon is representative of courts that
have adopted the disagreement instruction.7 1 In State v. Allen,78 the
court found that employing the unanimous acquittal instruction forces
a juror voting in the minority to choose among three options when
619, 623 n.1, 288 N.W.2d 207, 208 n.1 (1980).
Some studies indicate that, regardless of which instruction is given, requiring the
jury to consider the greater charge before addressing any lesser offenses may result
in a prosecutorial bias and in the imposition of harsher verdicts. See Greenberg,
Considering the Harshest Verdict First: Biasing Effects on Mock Juror Verdicts,
12 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY BULL. 41, 48 (1986).
[1]nstructing jurors to consider the harshest possible verdict first results
in a harsher final verdict [than would normally occur if the jury were
told to] consider the most lenient verdict ('not guilty') first. This research
suggests that the policy of instructing jurors to consider the harshest
verdict first . . . biases jurors in favor of conviction.
Id.
Other commentators have argued that this requirement impermissibly structures
jury deliberations. See, e.g., Improving Jury Deliberations, supra note 16, at 579.
Judge Johnson's concurrence in Ogden supports this view:
The premise underlying the lesser-included offense doctrine is that the
jury will reach a verdict on one of the offenses submitted and that the
selection of the appropriate offense is wholly within its province. The
manner and order in which the offenses are considered by the jury is
for it to decide.
35 Or. App. at 102, 580 P.2d at 1055. But see Mays, 407 Mich. at 623, 288
N.W.2d at 208 (no error to suggest order in which jurors should consider charges).
74. See, e.g., State v. Allen, 301 Or. 35, 37, 717 P.2d 1178, 1179 (1986) (en
banc).
75. Michigan and Oregon have expressly adopted the disagreement instruction.
See Mays, 407 Mich. at 623, 288 N.W.2d at 208; Ogden, 35 Or. App. at 98, 580
P.2d at 1053; see also State v. Krup, 36 Wash. App. 454, 462, 676 P.2d 507, 512
(1984) (Washington State Constitution does not require jury to unanimously acquit
defendant on greater offense before considering lesser included offenses).
Some courts have held that the defendant may choose the form of instruction.
See United States v. Cardinal, 782 F.2d 34, 37 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
1161 (1986); United States v. Roland, 748 F.2d 1321, 1323-24 (2d Cir. 1984); United
States v. Jackson, 726 F.2d 1466, 1469 (9th Cir. 1984); Catches v. United States,
582 F.2d 453, 459 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Tsanas, 572 F.2d 340, 346 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 995 (1978).
76. See, e.g., United States v. Dixon, 507 F.2d 683, 684 (8th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 976 (1976); United States v. Smoot, 463 F.2d 1221, 1223 n.1
(D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v. Singleton, 447 F. Supp. 852, 856 (S.D.N.Y.
1978).
77. See infra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
78. 301 Or. 35, 717 P.2d 1178 (1986) (en banc).
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the jury deadlocks: (1) persuading the majority to change its opinion;
(2) changing his own opinion; or (3) holding out and causing the
jury to hang.79 The Allen court concluded that because these con-
ditions exacerbate "the risk of coerced decisions"80 the unanimous
acquittal instruction is improper ." Michigan courts have adopted
this reasoning as well, holding that a unanimous acquittal instruction
improperly interferes with the jury's deliberations.8 2
I11. The Unanimous Acquittal Rule Best Serves the Jury System
The function of a jury in a criminal proceeding is to place the
common-sense judgment Of an impartial group of laymen between
the government and the accused and to determine, by group delib-
eration, the guilt or innocehce of that individual.83 The unanimous
acquittal rule furthers this fUnction because it promotes full delib-
eration on each offense, reduces compromise verdicts and ensures
that a jury will render a clear verdict on each of the charges.8 4
A. The Unanimous Acquittal Rule Promotes Full Deliberation
To reach unanimity, each juror scrutinizes the evidence presented
at trial,85 and individual impressions are expressed and analyzed until
79: Id. at 39, 717 P.2d at 1180. The court also noted that the unanimous
acquittal instruction had been the standard instruction in that state for over 75
years. Id. at 38, 717 P.2d at 1180.
80. Id. at 40, 717 P.2d at 1181.
81. Id.
82. See People v. Mays, 407 Mich. 619, 623, 288 N.W.2d 207, 208 (1980)
(unanimous acquittal instruction impedes proper jury consideration of lesser of-
fenses).
83. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 410 (1972); 5 J. MOORE, MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 38.02, at 14 (2d ed. 1985) (jury stands as protector of weak
against powerful) (hereinafter MOORE].
84. See People v. Boettcher, 69 N.Y.2d 174, 182-83, 505 N.E.2d 594, 597-98,
513 N.Y.S.2d 83, 86-87 (1987); see also infra notes 85-162 and accompanying text.
85. A unanimity requirement forces the jury to deliberate fully before reaching
a verdict and tends to ensure reliability in the final result:
[In the deliberation process, the] irrelevancies that creep into decision-
making will be exposed and rejected. Any one [member of the jury] may
become a teacher, and at times different jurors will teach. They call to
the attention of other jurors items of evidence that have been forgotten
or processes of decision-making that have not yet been thought of by
the others. Although all of the jurors are exposed to the same evidence,
argument, and instructions, persons with different backgrounds will see
and hear differently. When the jury is deliberating, they are teaching
each other. They teach about the facts, the rationale of the case, and
even the law. This helps prevent error in the final decision. The result
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a common interpretation is reached. 6 This process elicits the strengths
of each juror's viewpoint and eliminates erroneous views of law and
individual biases." Because use of the unanimous acquittal rule
necessarily requires this process, it promotes full and careful con-
sideration of each offense and reduces the likelihood that a jury
will move too quickly to consider a lesser included offense."
1. The Unanimous Acquittal Rule and Unanimous Final Verdicts
In many ways, the unanimous acquittal rule is analogous to the
rule requiring the jury's final verdict in a case to be unanimous.""
Both rules encourage the jury to undertake a thorough examination
of all evidence presented at trial before rendering a verdict. 9' Under
each rule the jury's deliberative process is complete and allows for
the full expression of different viewpoints. 91 Finally, each rule fosters
a reliable verdict. 92
The Supreme Court has long assumed that a unanimity requirement
for final jury verdicts is inherent in a federal criminal defendant's
is more likely to be sound and correct.
Joiner; From The Bench, in THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA 146-47 (R. Simon ed.
1975) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Joiner].
Under a unanimity rule, jurors have a duty to consider minority viewpoints. Id.
Under a majority rule, not only is it unlikely for minority jurors to accept the
task of "teaching" the majority, but studies indicate that when the minority's votes
are not needed for a decision, the minority tends not to defend its positions as
fully or present them as well as it would under a unanimity requirement. See
Nemeth, Interactions Between Jurors as a Function of Majority vs. Unanimity
Decision Rules, 7 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 38, 40 (1977) [hereinafter Nemethl.
Under a majority rule, jurors in mock jury deliberations tend to be "relatively
hurried, cursory on testimony-law connections, less respectful of their own and
others' persuasiveness and openmindedness, and less vigorous in discussion." R.
HASTIE, S. PENROD & N. PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE JURY 165 (1983) [hereinafter
HASTIE]. Furthermore, under controlled circumstances, majority rule juries were
also more likely to render the experimentally "improper" verdict. Id. at 228.
86. See Joiner, supra note 85, at 146-47.
87. Id.
88. See People v. Boettcher, 69 N.Y.2d 174, 183, 505 N.E.2d 594, 597-98, 513
N.Y.S.2d 83, 87 (1987); see also Tsanas v. United States, 572 F.2d 340, 346 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 995 (1978); infra notes 89-137 and accompanying text.
89. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require a unanimous jury verdict
in federal criminal trials. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(a); see also Andres v. United
States, 333 U.S. 740, 748 (1948) (unanimity required for all issues left to jury
when sixth and seventh amendments apply). But see Johnson v. Louisiana, 406
U.S. 356, 362 (1972) (no unanimity requirement in state criminal proceedings);
Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 412 (1972) (same).




FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL [Vol. XVI
sixth amendment 3 right to a trial by jury.94 Only recently, in Johnson
v. Louisiana5, did the Court hold that the sixth amendment, as
applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment, does not
impose a similar requirement on state criminal proceedings. 96 Over
93. The sixth amendment states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the [sitate and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
to have compulsory process for obtaining [w]itnesses in his favor, and
to have the [alssistance of [clounsel for his defense.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
94. See Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 748-49 (1948); American Pub-
lishing Co. v. Fisher, 166 U.S. 464, 468 (1897).
95. 406 U.S. 356 (1972). In Johnson, the Court upheld state provisions allowing
less than unanimous final verdicts in certain criminal cases. See id. at 363. At that
time, the Louisiana provision in question permitted such verdicts:
Cases, in which the punishment may be at hard labor, shall be tried by
a jury of five, all of whom must concur to render a verdict; cases, in
which the punishment is necessarily at hard labor, by a jury of twelve,
nine of whom must concur to render a verdict; cases in which the
punishment may be capital, by a jury of twelve, all of whom must
concur to render a verdict.
See id. at 357-58 n.l. Justice White, writing the plurality opinion of the Court,
found that jurors operating under a majority rule would not act irresponsibly or
ignore minority viewpoints. See id. at 361. The dissent, however, asserted that
juries can act unreasonably and even improperly and that by removing the unanimity
requirement, the Court in fact encouraged such behavior. Id. at 388-91 (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
The Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure now contains the following provision:
Cases in which punishment may be capital shall be tried by a jury of
twelve jurors, all of whom must concur to render a verdict. Cases in
which punishment is necessarily confinement at hard labor shall be tried
by a jury composed of twelve jurors, ten of whom must concur to render
a verdict. Cases in which the punishment may be confinement at hard
labor shall be tried by a jury composed of six jurors, all of whom must
concur to render a verdict.
LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 782(A) (West 1981).
The proposition that unanimous juries render more reliable verdicts than non-
unanimous juries seems implicit in the Louisiana law, for a unanimous verdict by
12 is required before a person can be convicted of a capital offense. See id.
"Apparently the people . . . want to be as certain as possible of guilt before
convicting a defendant of [a capital offense], but do not feel it is necessary to be.
quite so certain of guilt before convicting him of any other crime." Comment,
Should Jury Verdicts Be Unanimous in Criminal Cases?, 47 OR. L. REV. 417, 424
(1968).
Some jurisdictions regard the unanimity requirement so highly that even voluntary
waiver of it is prohibited. See, e.g., Hibdon v. United States, 204 F.2d 834, 838-
39 (6th Cir. 1953).
96. See Johnson, 406 U.S. at 362-63; see also Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S.
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a strong dissent, the Court in Johnson upheld the defendant's con-
viction by a less than unanimous jury and concluded that majority-
imposed decisions did not taint the deliberative process. 97
Writing for the dissent, Justice Douglas argued that a unanimity
requirement forces jurors to defend conflicting recollections and
"flushes out many nuances which otherwise would go overlooked." 91
Absent such a requirement, the reliability of the final verdict is
diminished because the jury will not debate and deliberate as fully.9 '
Thus, according to the dissent, majority-imposed decisions remove
an "automatic check against hasty fact-finding by relieving jurors
of the duty to hear out fully the dissenters."'00
2. Unanimity and Majority Decision Rules
The Johnson decision sparked a great deal of research into the
deliberative processes of juries and whether unanimity or majority
decision rules'0' have any effect on final verdicts. These studies show
that decision rules do in fact have a demonstrable effect on jury
deliberations. 02 Studies of group behavior patterns, particularly the
interactions between jurors operating under different decision rules,
concluded overwhelmingly that such rules have an impact on the
entire deliberative process. 03
404, 406 (1972). The Johnson decision resulted from a split in the Court. Four
Justices joined the Court's plurality opinion, concluding that unanimity was not
an essential feature of the sixth amendment right to a jury trial. See Johnson, 406
U.S. at 357-65. Four Justices dissented, finding no distinction between federal and
state criminal trials on the theory that the entire scope of sixth amendment rights
was applicable to the states. See id. at 380-403 (Douglas, Stewart, Brennan, Marshall,
JJ., dissenting). Justice Powell cast the swing vote with the plurality opinion to
the extent he found unanimity not essential in state criminal proceedings and with
the dissenters to the extent that he found unanimity still required in federal trials.
See id. at 369. Powell rejected the view that the Court's prior holding in Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), incorporated all sixth amendment rights into
the fourteenth amendment due process clause. See Johnson, 406 U.S. at 373.
97. See id. at 363.
98. Id. at 389 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
99. See id. at 388 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 389 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
101. The term "decision rule" is used in this Note to describe a rule that guides
a jury's deliberations. Under a unanimity rule, the jury must deliberate until all
members concur on a verdict. Under a majority rule, the jury must deliberate until
a specified number of jurors, for example 9 or 10 out of 12, concur on a verdict.
102. See generally infra notes 104-52 and accompanying text.
103. See id.
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Although juries deliberating under a unanimity requirement gen-
erally take longer to reach a decision,' °4 deliberations under a una-
nimity rule are not simply longer versions of majority rule
deliberations." 5 Important changes occur in unanimity rule juries
after a substantial majority is reached but prior to total agreement. 16
During this period, considerable portions of the case are discussed," 7
the jury may request further instructions from the trial judge and
verdict choices of individual jurors may be changed.108
Majority rule juries, however, tend to stop deliberating upon
reaching the requisite majority.'" Jurors under a majority rule take
104. As a general rule, smaller groups complete their tasks faster and more
efficiently than larger groups because the lattei inhibit the amount of discussion
and the expression of disagreement. See M. SAKS, JURY VERDICTS 12 (1977) [here-
inafter SAKS]. In essence, a jury operating under a majority rule is a smaller group
than one required to deliberate until unanimity. Id.
Shorter deliberation time may reflect haste and promote oversight. See Davis,
Kerr, Atkin, Holt & Meek, The Decision Processes of 6- and 12-Person Mock
Juries Assigned Unanimous and Two-Thirds Majority Rules, 32 J. PERSONALITY &
Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 1, 12 (1975) [hereinafter Davis & Kerr].
Jurors operating under a majority rule exhibit less respect for the deliberative
process. See HASTIE, supra note 85, at 79. Consequently, jurors have less motivation
to review thoroughly all of the information available before deciding on a verdict.
See id.
Experimental studies also show that polling methods can affect the speed of
deliberations. See V. HANS & N. VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 104 (1986) [hereinafter
HANS & VIDMAR]. In one study, juries that frequently used secret ballots were
more likely to deadlock, while juries that frequently took polls before beginning
to deliberate reached a verdict quickly. Id. Juries that delayed voting until unanimity
was reached were the slowest to return verdicts. Id. at 104.
105. See infra notes 106-37 and accompanying text.
106. See HASTIE, supra note 85, at 228-29.
107. The results of one experiment indicated that in unanimity rule juries, a
large proportion of the discussion took place between the period when the largest
faction reached 10 and the time when the final verdict was rendered. See id. at
229. The content of these discussions included several error corrections and references
to the standard of proof. Id.
108. See id. Studies have reached different conclusions regarding the probability
that a minority faction will successfully convince the majority to change its verdict.
Id. One scholar concluded that "[in groups that reached consensus, in only about
one in ten times did a minority coalition succeed in convincing a majority of the
jurors to accept its point of view. Among that 10 percent, the size of the minority
was most often five." R. SIMON, THE JURY: ITS ROLE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 64
(1980) [hereinafter SIMON]. Other studies found that minority jurors arguing for
acquittal are more often successful at swaying the majority than minority jurors
pressing for conviction. See HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 104, at 110; Nemeth,
supra note 85, at 54 (fairly high proportion of minority arguing for acquittal
prevail). "i~t is easier to raise a 'reasonable doubt' than to convince a person
beyond such a doubt." Id.
109. See Kerr, Atkin, Strasser, Meek, Holt & Davis, Guilt Beyond A Reasonable
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a subtle message from an instruction that they need not be unanimous
that causes them to be less thorough in their evaluation of both
the law and the evidence presented at trial."10 One study of mock
juries " observed that more.than a third of the verdicts rendered
by majority rule juries were "improper" under the circumstances
presented to the group." 2 This study also found that under a una-
nimity rule, the moderating influence of longer, more thorough
deliberations tended to eradicate errors that frequently occurred in
the other groups.'"
Since majority rule juries rarely deliberate past reaching the req-
uisite majority, minority factions seldom have an opportunity to
express fully their arguments." 4 Thus, by systematically excluding
or ignoring these dissenting views, majority rule juries also render
verdicts that are a product of a more homogenous, less representative
portion of the community. '
Under a unanimity rule, members of minority factions are en-
couraged to express their opinions about the case and participate
actively in the deliberations."16 Because each juror must agree before
Doubt: Effects of Concept Definition and Assigned Decision Rule on the Judgments
of Mock Jurors, 34 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 282, 292 (1976) [hereinafter
Kerr & Atkin]; Nemeth, supra note 85, at 53. According to Kerr's study, most
majority rule groups stopped deliberating after the required majority had been
reached; half of the majority rule groups ceased deliberating altogether after the
first deciding ballot. See Kerr & Atkin, supra, at 292.
110. See HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 104, at 175. Under a majority rule, the
influence of jurors trying to argue a minority position is diluted. Id. This fear
was articulated by the dissenting Justices in Johnson. See Johnson, 406 U.S. at
388, 396 (Douglas, Brennan, JJ., dissenting, respectively).
11l. The availability of information that researchers may obtain from actual
jury deliberations is restricted by law. See 18 U.S.C. § 1508 (recording, listening
to or observing proceedings of grand or petit juries while deliberating is unlawful);
See also Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 149 (1982) (jury should deliberate
free from external influences that disturb exercise of unbiased judgment). Mock
experiments cannot replicate the exact conditions of actual jury deliberations, how-
ever, they provide invaluable insight that assists researchers in analyzing general
behavioral patterns.
112. Under this particular study, a verdict of first degree murder was treated
as error because it "required a truly exceptional interpretation of the evidence
presented at trial." See HASTIE, supra note 85, at 228. Nevertheless, four out of
11 juries operating under a majority rule rendered such a verdict. Id. Systematic
patterns of errors were also associated with such verdicts. Id. None of the five
unanimity rule juries returned a verdict of first degree murder. Id.
113.. See id. at 228-29.
114. Cf. Johnson, 406 U.S. at 397 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
115. See id. at 396 (Brennan, J., dissenting); HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 104,
at 172-75.
116. See HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 104, at 174. Participation by members of
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a verdict is rendered, small factions are significantly more influential
in unanimity rule juries than in majority rule juries."' Regardless
of whether they eventually conform"' to the majority viewpoint,
minority jurors retain a considerable amount of influence over the
final outcome."19 As a result, unanimity rule jurors tend to be more
confident with the final verdict than their majority rule counterparts 20
the jury may also depend upon the situational aspects of the group and the various
personality types involved. One study indicated that "a person in the minority may
be less likely to express his views when in a larger group as the number of
unanimous majority members is greater .... However, a minority member is more
likely to express his views if he has an ally ...... Kessler, The Social Psychology
of Jury Deliberations, in THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA 69, 83-84 (R. Simon ed.
1975) (citations omitted) [hereinafter Kessler].
The size of the minority faction may also determine the probability that an
individual juror will participate actively. See HASTIE, supra note 85, at 119. Generally,
in larger factions, individual members are less likely to speak. Id. Decision rules
have an interesting effect on this principle-one study found that "[tihe tendency
for members of very small factions to speak with a relatively high probability
reached its extreme in [unanimity rule juries] and diminished in majority rule
juries." Id.
117. See HASTIE, supra note 85, at 112.
118. One study of group member participation as a function of group size and
various personality types arrived at the following conclusion:
When there is a deviant group member, such as a minority jury member,
group research indicates that there will be more initial communication
toward the deviate, especially if he greatly deviates from the group, or
there seems to be a chance of changing his mind. If the group is unable
to bring the deviate into the fold, he may be totally excluded from the
group by decreasing the amount of communication toward him ....
Kessler, supra note 116, at 84 (citation omitted). In Kessler's studies, majority
factions in some majority rule juries questioned the minority on their reasons for
deviating and sought to have them conform, despite the fact that the group had
a sufficient number of jurors to render a verdict. Id. Kessler noted that this aspect
of minority participation is important when juries operate under a majority rule.
Id. But see supra note 110 and accompanying text (other studies indicate that juries
may often cease deliberating immediately upon reaching the requisite majority).
119. In unanimity rule juries, dissenting or unformed opinions tend to create
"pressures." See HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 104, at 110. These pressures will
often lead to spirited discussion among jurors with conflicting viewpoints in order
to forge common ground upon which they can all agree. Id. at I 11.
120. Jurors in unanimity rule juries perceive the group decision making process
as more difficult, but more thorough and serious than the process under a majority
decision rule. See HASTIE, supra note 85, at 79. Consequently, minority jurors
under a unanimity rule were especially likely to believe that they had had the
opportunity to express all of their arguments concerning the case. Id. Although
deliberations tended to be dominated by majority influence, unanimity rule juries
expressed more confidence in the final verdict. Id. at 30; see also Kerr & Atkin,
supra note 109, at 290-91 (dissatisfaction of majority rule jurors with final verdict
attributable to inability to express all their views fully); Nemeth, supra note 85,
at 55-56. In three studies of unanimous versus quorum verdicts, actual verdicts
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because their decision reflects a more complex analysis, evaluation
and application of all relevant information. 2
One final rationale for maintaining the use of a jury is the
assumption that jury duty fosters a citizen's respect for the fairness
of the criminal justice system. 2 Studies of group behavior in majority
rule juries suggest, however, that this assumption is less valid when
unanimity is not required.'23 In fact, the hasty deliberative process
and frequency of compromise verdicts resulting from majority de-
cision rules causes jurors to become disenchanted with the entire
jury system. 24
were not significantly altered but the unanimous juries reported reaching full
consensus, confidence in the final verdict and a belief that justice had been
administered. Id. at 53.
121. See HASTIE, supra note 85, at 228-29.
In general, effective group decision making involves considering possible alter-
natives and choosing one. See Smith, Petersen, Johnson & Johnson, The Effects
of Controversy and Concurrence Seeking on Effective Decision Making, 126 J.
Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 237 (1986) [hereinafter Smith & Petersen]. To achieve this goal,
the group must (1) search for all relevant information on the issue under discussion;
(2) exchange all relevant information, critically evaluate it and maintain effective
working procedures within the group; (3) make a decision that reflects a complex
analysis, synthesis, evaluation and application of all relevant information; (4) pro-
mote a sense of personal commitment through the perception of having personally
influenced the group's decision; and (5) promote satisfaction with the final decision.
See id. at 238. Effective jury performance, however, requires more: representation
by a cross-section of the community; the full expression of all viewpoints; accurate
and thorough fact-finding and the ability to render accurate verdicts by applying
the judge's instructions on law to the evidence adduced at trial. See HASTIE, supra
note 85, at 227.
Controversy, like that created under any type of unanimity rule, promotes higher
quality decision making by stimulating interest in the problem being discussed and
greater personal interest in, and satisfaction with, the final decision. See Smith &
Petersen, supra, at 246. The belief that controversy creates feelings of alienation
or inhibits influence is unfounded. Id. at 247
122. See United States v. Edwards, 823 F.2d 111, 117 (5th Cir. 1987) (jury's
role as impartial, functioning, deliberative body is sine qua non of criminal justice
system); Kerr & Atkin, supra note 109, at 292-93. The importance of the symbolic
function of the jury should not be overlooked:
[Riules of trial procedure . . . serve a vital role as ... a reminder to
the community of the principles it holds important. The presumption of
innocence, the rights to counsel . . . matter not only as devices for
achieving or avoiding certain kinds of trial outcomes, but also as affir-
mations of respect for the accused as a human being-affirmations that
remind him and the public about the sort of society we want to become
and, indeed, about the sort of society we are.
Tribe, Trial By Mathematics: Precision and Ritual In the Legal Process, 84 HARV.
L. REV. 1329, 1391-92 (1971).
123. See Kerr & Atkin, supra note 109, at 292-93.
124. See id.
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The logic derived from the results of these studies directly applies
to the pivotal problems addressed in the dispute over the proper
lesser included offense instruction. 2 Just as unanimity in the final
verdict promotes thorough deliberations and the full expression of
all viewpoints, 26 the unanimous acquittal rule encourages jurors to
thoroughly review the evidence and then apply the facts to the
applicable law to reach a clear verdict on each charge. '27
Majority decision rules invite hasty decision-making and discourage
prolonged effort to achieve a mutually acceptable result.'28 Similarly,
the disagreement rule not only discourages prolonged discussion
among jurors but also allows concerns unrelated to the case to
dominate the deliberations. 2 9 Thus, under the disagreement rule, the
jury may eventually reach a final verdict based not on the merits
of the case, but on sympathy for the defendant or on an attempt
to appease a holdout juror.'30
Courts that adopt the disagreement instruction criticize unanimity
rules, including the unanimous acquittal instruction, for the poten-
tially coercive effect they have on jurors. 3 ' A common assumption
of these courts is that when deliberations deadlock, jurors in the
majority will try to engender feelings of inferiority or unreasona-
bleness among the minority jurors in order to pressure them into
conforming with the majority's verdict choice.' The results of many
125. See infra notes 126-37 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 104-21 and accompanying text.
127. See, e.g,, People v. Zwiers, 191 Cal. App. 3d 1498, 237 Cal. Rptr. 123
(1987); People v. Boettcher, 69 N.Y.2d 174, 183, 505 N.E.2d 594, 597-98, 513
N.Y.S.2d 83, 87 (1987).
128. See supra notes 109-21 and accompanying text.
129. Cf. Boettcher, 69 N.Y.2d at 183, 505 N.E.2d at 597-98, 513 N.Y.S.2d at
87 (disagreement rule promotes compromise based upon sympathy for defendant
or desire to appease stubborn jurors).
130. See id.
131. See People v. Mays, 407 Mich. 619, 622-23, 288 N.W.2d 207, 208 (1980);
State v. Ogden, 35 Or. App. 91, 98, 580 P.2d 1049, 1053 (1978). See generally
Improving Jury Deliberations, supra note 16. However, some judges have commented
that requiring a unanimous acquittal of the greater crime before permitting con-
sideration of lesser offenses is no more coercive than requiring the same number
to find the defendant guilty of the lesser offense. See Ogden, 35 Or. App. at 103,
580 P.2d at 1055 (Thornton, J., dissenting).
132. One commentator provided some anecdotal evidence demonstrating how
votes may be cast without regard to guilt or innocence:
A Southern California woman juror, while deliberating on a drug case,
prayed to God that a hold-out juror would change his vote to guilty.
If her prayers were answered, according to an affidavit filed by another
juror, the hold-out juror would wear his blue blazer as a sign from
God. The hold-out wore his blue blazer, and on that day the jury
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studies suggest, however, that the contrary is true-when jurors must
deliberate until unanimity, those who change their verdict tend to
have been less certain of their initial decision than the other jurors. 13
The change occurs not because of undue coercion, 3 ' but rather
because the minority is persuaded by the merits of the majority's
position.135 The risk of coerced decisions is further reduced by the
fact that jurors operating under a unanimity rule approach the
deliberations more seriously than do majority rule jurors.' Jurors
who change their previously held individual verdicts to conform to
the majority position do so based on a true change of belief and
not merely as a response to group pressure. 13
convicted [the] defendant . .. of drug conspiracy charges. The hold-out
juror was not told of the prayer prior to the vote .... [The defense
attorney requested] an evidentiary hearing on the extent to which the
perceived sign from God influenced other jurors .... [In his brief, he
wrote] "[mioreover, after learning of such a sign from God, it would
be extremely difficult for a juror to change his vote from guilty to not
guilty or to give serious consideration to the views of dissenting jurors."
Moss, Did God Visit The Jury Room?, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1, 1988, at 29, col. I.
133. See Tanford & Penrod, Jury Deliberations: Discussion Content and Influence
Processes in Jury Decision Making, 16 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOLOGy 322, 344
(1986).
134. The question of whether a juror was unduly coerced often arises when the
trial judge administers an "Allen" instruction, or "dynamite charge," to the jury.
The instruction originated in Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896), and was
commonly used to break deadlocks. The Supreme Court summarized the trial court's
instruction:
[1If much the larger number were for conviction, a dissenting juror should
consider whether his doubt was a reasonable one which made no im-
pression upon the minds of so many men, equally honest, equally in-
telligent with himself. If, upon the other hand, the majority was for
acquittal, the minority ought to ask themselves whether they might not
reasonably doubt the correctness of a judgment which was not concurred
in by the majority.
Id. at 501. The instruction is effective at producing verdicts. Although the Court
has upheld its use, the Allen instruction has aroused much criticism and comment.
See generally Improving Jury Deliberations, supra note 16, at 571-73. Some re-
searchers have advocated the use of these coercive instructions to eliminate stubborn
jurors and encourage interaction among the group. See HASTIE, supra note 85, at
167. A fuller analysis of the appropriateness of an "Allen" type instruction exceeds
the scope of this Note.
135. See SIMON, supra note 108, at 63.
136. See HASTIE, supra note 85, at 79.
137. See SIMON, supra note 108, at 63. When jurors were given an opportunity
to state privately what their verdicts were, they reported the same opinion as that
rendered by the group. Id. For many of these jurors, the group discussion was
the significant factor in changing their individual verdicts to make them consistent
with the majority. Id.
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B. Compromise Verdicts
To a certain degree, compromise is both an inevitable138 and
desirable factor in jury deliberations. 3 9 Courts recognize the jury's
right to render compromise verdicts,'140 although judges strongly dis-
courage them.' 4 ' Inherent in the jury's power to compromise, how-
ever, exists a risk that the power will be abused.14  The unanimous
acquittal instruction acts as a curb on this power by striking a
balance between society's interest in punishing offenders and ad-
ministering justice and the jury's right to return a compromise
verdict.14 The instruction reduces the likelihood that a jury's verdict
will be the product of undesirable compromise or based on concerns
unrelated to the merits of the case. 44 Nevertheless, the instruction
does not prevent the jury from dispensing mercy should it find that
the prosecution has failed to prove some element of its case beyond
a reasonable doubt.' 45
By promoting full consideration of each offense and by reducing
the opportunity for unmerited compromise, the unanimous acquittal
instruction encourages the jury to exercise its historical duty as the
138. Studies indicate that juries often compromise on a lesser offense when they
have the option of convicting on a lesser included offense. See Vidmar, Effects
of Decision Alternatives on the Verdicts and Social Perceptions of Simulated Jurors,
22 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 211, 214-16 (1972). When given a choice
between a verdict of first degree murder or not guilty, 54% of the mock juries
acquitted. Id. at 214. When given a choice of four options, the juries returned
verdicts of first degree murder in 8% of the cases, second degree murder in 63%,
manslaughter in 21%, and not guilty in 807o. Id. at 215.
139. Commentators assert that desirable compromise is motivated by "the merits
of the case or a desire to seek justice through the proper channels." Improving
Jury Deliberations, supra note 16, at 568 n.32 (compromise verdict resulting from
jury's concern that prosecutor overcharged is desirable).
140. See Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 394 (1932).
141. See People v. Boettcher, 69 N.Y.2d 174, 183, 505 N.E.2d 594, 597-98, 513
N.Y.S.2d 83, 87 (1987); see also United States v. Thompson, 492 F.2d 359, 362
(8th Cir. 1974) (defendant entitled to lesser offense instruction only if evidence
would justify conviction of lesser offense).
142. See Boettcher, 69 N.Y.2d at 183, 505 N.E.2d at 597-98, 513 N.Y.S.2d at
87. See generally HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 104, at 132-48 (sympathy and prejudice
affect deliberations); H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 381-94 (1966)
(jurors' personal and social characteristics influence jury performance at deliberation
stage) [hereinafter KALVEN & ZEISEL]; SIMON, supra note 108, at 38-40, 52-53 (same);
Stephan, Selective Characteristics of Jurors and Litigants: Their Influences on Juries'
Verdicts, in THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA 97-115 (R. Simon ed. 1975).
143. Cf. Boettcher, 69 N.Y.2d at 183, 505 N.E.2d at 597-98, 513 N.Y.S.2d at
87 (while courts may acknowledge existence of compromise they should not create
environment conducive to such behavior).
144. See generally id.
145. See id. at 182, 505 N.E.2d at 597, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
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finder of facts.146 The disagreement instruction, on the other hand,
circumvents this fact-finding duty by providing the jury with the
means to avoid complete debate on the greater crime by simply
rendering a verdict on an offense consisting of fewer elements.141
Though this approach may be more practical in that it obviates the
need for lengthy deliberations, it also allows individual biases to
dominate the jury's fact-finding obligations.1 8 Moreover, because
the votes of minority jurors deliberating on the greater offense are
not needed in order to consider lesser offenses, there is no incentive
for these jurors to fully present and defend their views in an effort
to persuade the majority on the merit of their position.149
Concern over unmerited compromise has led many courts to restrict
the scope of the lesser included offense doctrine by requiring that
one party affirmatively request that the judge instruct on all lesser
offenses. 50 Restricting the jury's verdict choices, however, is not the
answer.' If complete deliberation on each offense is assured, a
verdict on an offense other than the one originally charged is a
perfectly acceptable final outcome.'
C. The Unanimous Acquittal Rule Protects Against Double
Jeopardy
Commentators object that the unanimous acquittal instruction
prejudices the defendant because the benefits of thorough deliberation
on the charged offense accrue only to the state.'53 This objection,
however, fails to recognize that courts have not addressed the ques-
tion of whether the doctrine of implied acquittal would protect a
146. See United States v. Harary, 457 F.2d 471, 478-79 (2d Cir. 1972); Lightfoot
v. United States, 378 A.2d 670, 673 (D.C. App. 1977); People v. Mussenden, 308
N.Y. 558, 562, 127 N.E.2d 551, 553 (1955).
147. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
148. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
149. See HASTIE, supra note 85, at 31; SAKS, supra note 104, at 23 (evidence
suggests that unanimity uncovers views of minority jurors); SIMON, supra note 108,
at 69 (minority faction may be totally excluded from group discussion when
unanimity rule not applied); Kerr & Atkin, supra note 109, at 290-91 (minority
opinions often unheard in majority rule juries).
150. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 492 F.2d 359, 362 (8th Cir. 1974).
151. See generally Improving Jury Deliberations, supra note 16.
152. See id.
153. See Note, State v. Wussler: An Unfortunate Change in Arizona's Lesser-
Included Offense Jury Instruction, 27 ARtz. L. REV. 515, 524 (1985) (state desires
full consideration lest it be precluded from retrying defendant on greater charge
if jury returns conviction on lesser). The scope of this preclusive effect, however,
is unclear. See infra notes 156-65 and accompanying text.
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defendant from subsequent reprosecution of the greater offense after
a jury deliberates under the disagreement rule and convicts the
defendant of a lesser offense.
The implied acquittal doctrine, as set forth by the Supreme Court, 5 4
states that when a jury is silent on the greater offense, but returns
a verdict on a lesser offense, the jury is deemed to have impliedly
acquitted the defendant of the greater charge.'" At this point, double
jeopardy protection attaches and forbids a second prosecution on
the greater charge. 5 , As the court noted in Boettcher, however,
there is a strong policy against protecting a defendant from multiple
prosecutions for the same offense unless a jury actually finds the
accused not guilty of that charge. 5 7 In formulating the implied
acquittal doctrine, the Supreme Court acknowledged the validity of
such a policy by assuming that a jury's silence on the greater offense
only follows a full and final determination of the defendant's guilt
on that charge-as if the jury had returned a verdict that expressly
read: "We find the defendant not guilty of murder in the first
degree but guilty of murder in the second degree."' 8 Thus, a careful
reading of this doctrine would call into question the scope of double
jeopardy protection under the disagreement rule.' 519 In choosing the
disagreement rule, a defendant might unknowingly subject himself
to the possibility of a second prosecution on the charged offense
should a jury convict him of some lesser crime.' 60
154. In Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957), the Court held that a jury's
silence on the greater charge after returning a verdict on the lesser charge barred
subsequent retrial on the greater charge under the doctrine of "implied acquittal."
See id. at 190; see also 8A MOORE, supra note 83, § 31.03(4).
155. See supra note 154.
156. See id.
157. See People v. Boettcher, 69 N.Y.2d 174, 182, 505 N.E.2d 594, 597, 513
N.Y.S.2d 83, 86 (1987).
158. See Green, 355 U.S. at 191.
159. Any other conclusion would fail to comport with the Court's subsequent
decisions holding that society has the right to punish offenders and administer
justice. See United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 72 (1986) (quoting Engel v.
Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 127-28 (1982)).
160. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that "[tlhe defendant
may be found guilty of an offense necessarily included in the offense charged or
of an attempt to commit either the offense charged or an offense necessarily
included therein if the attempt is an offense." FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(c). This rule,
upon which Tsanas and its progeny are based, does not automatically deem a
conviction of a lesser offense an acquittal of the greater offense for double jeopardy
purposes. See Boettcher, 69 N.Y.2d at 182-83, 505 N.E.2d at 597, 513 N.Y.S.2d
at 86-87.
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The Tsanas and Boettcher courts also recognized this problem,
but each court was conspicuously hesitant to address the issue di-
rectly.161 The unanimous acquittal rule would avoid this problem as
well as benefit the defendant. By having the jury conclusively de-
termine, after thorough deliberation, guilt or innocence as to each
charge, the defendant clearly would be protected against retrial on
the greater offense should the jury render a verdict solely on the
lesser included offense. 62
D. Hung Juries
The unanimous acquittal instruction may cause the jury to deadlock
because it requires that all jurors concur before considering any
lesser included offense. 163 Proponents of the disagreement instruction
argue that allowing the jury to consider more options would decrease
the frequency of hung juries by compensating for one or two ir-
rational jurors whose stubbornness would otherwise hang the jury.' 6
161. See United States v. Tsanas, 572 F.2d 340, 346 n.7 (2d Cir.) (retrial
"apparently" barred) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 995 (1978); Boettcher,
69 N.Y.2d at 182-83, 505 N.E.2d at 597, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 86-87 (federal rule does
not automatically deem conviction for lesser offense an acquittal of greater, but
that is "usually" result) (emphasis added).
162. See supra notes 154-58 and accompanying text.
163. Most social science research indicates that juries that operate under any
type of unanimity requirement are more likely to deadlock. See, e.g., Kerr & Atkin,
supra note 109, at 285 (hung juries are most likely to result when initial disagreement
is maximal, i.e. when there is nearly an even split between those who favor conviction
and those who favor acquittal); Nemeth, supra note 85, at 53 (same). An estimated
five to 12076 of the criminal trials in the United States each year end in hung
juries. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 142, at 57; Flynn, supra note 19, at 130.
The "Chicago Jury Project," conducted by Kalven and Zeisel, based its findings
on court records, post-deliberation interviews, experimental cases before mock juries
and the observation of a limited number of actual jury deliberations. Their results
showed that hung juries occurred in 5.607o of cases in which unanimity was required
and 3.1% of majority rule cases. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 142, at 461.
The second study was performed by Professor Leo Flynn. His results were based
on studies of felony trials, over a three year period, in California's 10 most
populated counties. See Flynn, supra note 19, at 130. He found that hung juries
occurred in 12.2% of the cases (978 cases). Id.
The difference between the percentages of hung juries may arise from Kalven
& Zeisel's methodology. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 142, at 57. They suspected
that imprecise instructions regarding what constituted a reportable jury trial may
have caused some judges not to report mistrials. Id. at 57 n.2.
164. There are other methods to avoid this problem. The voir dire examination
and the availability of peremptory challenges and challenges for cause provide a
procedure for eliminating obstinate jurors from the jury panel. For an overview
of the voir dire process, see Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "It's Wonderful Power",
27 STAN. L. REV. 545 (1975).
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The evidence, however, suggests that hung juries are generally not
the result of one obstinate juror, but rather are a response to genuine
difficulties with the case. 65 In fact, one frequently cited study, the
Chicago Jury Project, indicated that the unreasonable obstinacy of
one juror is a rare event and that hung juries occur only in cases
with an initially large minority faction.' 66
Some commentators contend that a hung jury results in a "wholly
unsatisfactory conclusion to the criminal trial for it is neither an
acquittal nor a conviction. ' ' 6 7 They claim that because a mistrial
from a hung jury does not bar the state from prosecuting the
defendant again, the prosecution gains two unfair advantages: the
ability to remedy any tactical problem encountered in the first trial
and valuable insight into the defense strategy.' 61 Meanwhile, the
165. See Kalven & Zeisel, The American Jury: Notes for an English Controversy,
48 CHI. BAR RECORD 195, 201 (1967). A hung jury may also result from the lack
of clarity with which the presiding judge charges the jury on the relevant issues
of fact and law. See Note, Non-Unanimous Verdicts By Jury, 22 CORNELL L.Q.
415, 417 (1937).
166. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 142, at 462-63.
167. Improving Jury Deliberations, supra note 16, at 563.
168. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11 (1978); Green v. United States,
355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957) (repeated attempts to convict subject individual to
embarrassment, expense and enhance possibility that innocent person may be found
guilty); Partial Verdicts, supra note 33, at 893 (prosecution witnesses will be better
prepared and arguments that appeared weak at first trial will be strengthened);
Findlater, Retrial After A Hung Jury: The Double Jeopardy Problem, 129 U. PA.
L. REV. 701, 713 (1981) (risk of conviction increases on retrial because defendant's
resources diminish and it becomes more difficult to present adequate defense)
[hereinafter Findlater].
The prospect of a hung jury is damaging for the prosecution as well. See Fried,
Kaplan & Klein, Juror Selection: An Analysis of Voir Dire, in THE JURY SYSTEM
IN AMERICA 54 (R. Simon ed. 1975). In practice, a prosecutor will usually reduce
the charges against a defendant after the first trial results in a hung jury and will
rarely push a case beyond two hung juries. See id.
A court might employ several means to avoid a hung jury and the necessity of
a second prosecution. One method would require that the jury return a "special
verdict"-precise findings on each issue of fact-instead of a general verdict of
guilty or not guilty. See FED. R. Civ. P. 49(a) (court may require special findings
upon each factual issue). From these special verdicts, a judge would simply ex-
trapolate the defendant's guilt on either the charged offense or the lesser included
offenses based on the jury's findings. Although some commentators contend that
special verdicts take the actual determination of the case away from the jury and
give it to the judge, see Trubitt, Patchwork Verdicts, Different-Jurors Verdicts,
And American Jury Theory: Whether Verdicts Are Invalidated By Juror Disa-
greement On Issues, 36 OKLA. L. REV. 473, 494 (1983), their use in criminal cases
has been upheld. See United States v. Coonan, No. 88-3007, slip op. at 1626 (2d
Cir. Feb. 11, 1988). There is, however, a historical preference for general verdicts
that stems from the unique nature of the rights accorded to criminal defendants.
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defendant's limited resources are depleted, thereby making it more
difficult to present a decent defense and thus increasing the likelihood
of eventual conviction. 169
Conversely, a hung jury is also considered by many to be a
"safeguard to liberty" and "the sole means by which one or a few
may stand out against an overwhelming contemporary public sen-
timent." '' 70 Scholars note that "the hung jury is a treasured ...
phenomenon ... because it symbolizes our legal system's respect
for the minority view that is held strongly enough to thwart the
will of the majority.''7 Several courts have also echoed this sen-
timent. 172
Whether one believes that a hung jury should be cherished or
avoided, the need to expedite the judicial process simply does not
outweigh the defendant's right to a trial by jury.' 73 More important
than increasing the potential for jury deadlock, the unanimous ac-
quittal rule establishes guidelines for orderly and complete jury
deliberations.174 Moreover, it is a fundamental principle of consti-
See United States v. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d 913, 927 (2d Cir.) (Newman, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 831 (1984).
Another method would require that the jury deliberate under the unanimous
acquittal rule. Should the jury deadlock on the charged offense, however, the
prosecutor and defense attorney could agree to have the judge declare the jury
hung on that offense and permit deliberation on the lesser included offenses. In
exchange for the possibility of a present conviction on a lesser offense, the prosecutor
would agree to forego any subsequent litigation on the greater offense. The defendant
benefits by gaining protection against double jeopardy and avoiding the burdens
of reprosecution on the entire indictment.
169. See Green, 355 U.S. at 187-88; Findlater, supra note 168, at 713.
170. Huffman v. United States, 297 F.2d 754, 759 (5th Cir.) (Brown, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) (nothing should interfere with the exercise
of a hung jury), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 955 (1962).
171. HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 104, at 111-12. The hung jury is also a paradox-
it can only exist in moderation because too many would unacceptably disrupt the
court system. Id. But see Flynn, supra note 19, at 133 (hung juries do not render
court system ineffective or inefficient nor do they frustrate operations of other
aspects of criminal justice system).
In Flynn's study, 4007o of the cases that resulted in hung juries were dismissed,
340 were resolved by guilty pleas and 26% were retried. See id. Of the hung
juries, 62.607o favored conviction and 42.107o of those favored conviction by 9-3
or more. Id. at 131-32. Kalven and Zeisel reported similar results. See KALVEN &
ZEISEL, supra note 142, at 460.
172. See United States v. Angiulo, 485 F.2d 37, 40 n.3 (1st Cir. 1973); United
States v. Brown, 411 F.2d 930, 933-34 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1017
(1970); Green v. United States, 309 F.2d 852, 854 (5th Cir. 1962); State v. Fajardo,
67 Haw. 593, 699 P.2d 20, 24 (Haw. 1985).
173. See People v. Boettcher, 69 N.Y.2d 174, 183, 505 N.E.2d 594, 597-98, 513
N.Y.S.2d 83, 87 (1987).
174. See State v. Wussler, 139 Ariz. 428, 430, 679 P.2d 74, 76 (1984).
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tutional law that administrative efficiency may never justify in-
fringement of a constitutional right. 75
IV. Conclusion
Unwarranted compromise and hasty deliberations are detrimental
to all parties in a criminal proceeding. They damage the credibility
of the judicial system by producing unreliable and incomplete verdicts
and engender a feeling among jurors that justice has not been done.
The unanimous acquittal instruction curbs these abuses by achieving
a balance that protects the competing interests of the state and the
defendant but also allows the jury to function as the trier of fact.
Further, the unanimous acquittal instruction achieves such a balance
in a manner that is not Unduly coercive nor overly disruptive to
the deliberative process.
David Y. Atlas
175. See O'Clair v. Uiied States, 470 F.2d 1199, 1204 (lst Cir. i972), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 921 (1973).
